Fertility in South Korea - from past to present by Juszczyk-Frelkiewicz, Katarzyna
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Fertility in South Korea - from past to present 
 
Author: Katarzyna Juszczyk-Frelkiewicz 
 
Citation style: Juszczyk-Frelkiewicz Katarzyna. (2017). Fertility in South 
Korea - from past to present. W: K. Juszczyk-Frelkiewicz, G. Libor (red.), 
"Contemporary family - comparative perspective" (S. 131-149). Katowice : 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego 
 
 
      
        
Katarzyna Juszczyk ‑Frelkiewicz
University of Silesia in Katowice
Fertility in South Korea – 
from past to present
Introduction
The lifestyle of a Korean family has changed considerably over the past few 
decades. First of all, the trends in women’s fertility ‑related choices have changed. 
Contemporary Korean women postpone the decision to have their first child. 
More and more often they opt for childlessness in order to focus on their educa‑
tional development and professional career. Contemporary Korean women do not 
always have plans related to marriage or having children. They know that after 
getting married they will be under the authority of their husband and his family, 
and that they will have to resign from further education and career in order to 
take care of the house, husband, and children. However, a growing number of 
contemporary Korean women are inclined to pursue their professional careers 
while not resigning from taking care of the house and raising children (see: Eun 
Ki ‑Soo 2010.04.06, koreaherald.com). 
In South Korea the increase in the divorce rate and the drop in the number of 
marriages can be observed – the same tendencies are observed in demographic 
patterns in the countries of the Western Europe and in the United States (see: 
Eurostat).
Korea has undoubtedly experienced dramatic social changes in a relatively short 
period of time, and it is still in the midst of rapid change. And these changes have 
become apparent in family values and attitudes as well… Contemporary Korean 
society is definitely moving away from conservative family values toward the 
direction of gender equality and progressive attitudes on various family values 
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including marriage and gender roles. But for now, it is still premature to say that 
Korean family values are no longer traditional or conservative writes Eun Ki ‑Soo 
(koreaherald.com, 06.04.2010).
Like in other East Asian countries, families in Korea have been strongly in‑
fluenced by Confucianism. A  key influence of Confucianism is familism, which 
involves putting family first, respecting parents, continuing patrilineal family 
relationship, and socioeconomic ties among siblings and relatives. These ideals have 
been emphasized as family values from the mid ‑seventeenth century (see: Ok 1989).
Korean society is undergoing the process of westernization, however not in 
all areas of life. For instance, this process does not apply much to the social 
attitude to cohabitation or homosexual couples, which is in most cases negative 
(see: Panelnow 2014; follow: Hwajeong Yoo 2015).
Yet, according to the data from the international survey on the youth values 
in 2010 and in 2012 conducted by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 
the number of Korean cohabiting couples, whether they be heterosexual or ho‑
mosexual, is “estimated” to increase in Korea. This shows the growing acceptance 
of premarital cohabitation as well as homosexuality, although the degree of ac‑ 
ceptance is still on a low level (see: Choi Injae et al. 2011; Lim Heejin et al. 2012).
Results of the Statistics Korea social survey, conducted in 2014, show that 
the attitudes towards marriage and cohabitation are changing. The data suggest 
that priorities and values are shifting in postindustrial South Korean society. 
Interestingly, according to a  Dong ‑a  Ilbo report on the data, 46.6% of the re‑
spondents agree that “a  man and woman can live together even if they aren’t 
married.” Even though more than 50% of all the respondents disagreed (53.4%), 
over half of cohorts in their 20s and 30s either “completely” or “somewhat” 
agreed that cohabitation is acceptable (61.4% and 62.8%, respectively). Given the 
conservative nature of the South Korean society, these findings are significant 
(Denney 2015.02.27, thediplomat.com).
The above ‑described changes point to a slow dissolution of Confucian values 
that for centuries have been strongly embedded in the Korean society.
Korean families have been changing more than in any other period in Korean 
history writes S. Ok in “A study on familism in contemporary Korean families” 
(1989).
Rapid Fertility decline in South Korea
The concept of the contemporary Korean family dates back to the 1960s, 
a period of transformation that affected the economic and political spheres, as 
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well as cultural patterns and legal affairs. From the end of World War II until 
the 1960s, Korea experienced great social and economic difficulties such as the 
Korean War. After the 1960s, Korea began to industrialize rapidly, while also 
becoming more urban, and since then the Korean economy has grown faster 
than at any other time in its history. During these periods, the government made 
industrialization its top priority. This process brought about urbanization and 
changes in family type as nuclear families started prevailing. As a  result, the 
average household changed dramatically, especially the relationships among 
family members (Chung 2003).
The tremendous demographic changes, as well as changes in the family 
makeup itself, make it very hard to grasp the characteristics of the contempo‑
rary Korean family. Korea’s traditional culture, including its religious heritage, 
was seriously undermined during Japan’s colonial rule of Korea (1910–45) and 
during the Korean War (1950–53). To complicate the situation even more, since 
the 1960s, within a lifetime of a single generation, Korea has been transformed 
from an agrarian to an industrialized urban society. The adoption of not only 
Western science and technology, but also Western culture, has played a decisive 
role in bringing this transformation about. Swept into the country on the tides 
of westernization, industrialization, and economic development, Protestantism 
has taken root and expanded its reach (see: Park, Cho 1995). All of these societal 
forces have transformed the traditional value system and demographic charac‑
teristics of Korean families.
According to vital statistics data available online at Korean Statistical 
Information Service (KOSIS: kosis.kr), the Total fertility rate in South Korea 
was around 6.0 until the 1960s – it was so high that in 1962 a  national fam‑
ily planning program was launched as an integral part of national economic 
planning. The major goals of the program were to reduce the level of unwanted 
fertility, while at the same time reduce the desirable number of children to 
three or fewer. Korea’s family planning programs played a  major role in the 
fertility decline and constituted the principal means of implementing the gov‑
ernment’s population policies. In the early 1960s, the average ideal – desired 
– number of children reported by women was four and the TFR was about six. 
Most women had more children than the number they considered ideal (see: 
Kim 2005: 2–25). Obviously, the economic and social development made the 
job of reducing ideal family size easier, in as much as development creates an 
environment favorable to small ‑family values and norms. The family plan‑
ning program both legitimized the idea of family limitation within marriage, 
and provided easy and affordable access to contraception (Choe, Retherford 
2009: 271).
As a result of Korea’s family planning program implementation a rapid de‑
crease in fertility was observed. The total fertility dropped below the replacement 
level (2.1) in 1983, and has continued declining ever since (KOSIS: kosis.kr). 
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Because of declining fertility the Korean government eventually abolished 
the long ‑lasting anti ‑natalist policy in 1996 and shifted to a  pro ‑natalist 
policy in response to the fertility decline and population ageing, but these 
policy efforts do not yet appear to have brought much effect (see: Lee 2009: 
57–70).
The lowest fertility rate in South Korea was observed in 2005 and was 1,08. 
Vital Statistics show that TFR increased somewhat after 2005, from 1,08 in 2005 
to 1,13 in 2006 and 1,26 in 2007. Minja Kim Choe and Robert D. Retherford 
(2009: 284) argue that the increase seems largely due to an increase in the 
number of first marriages in 2006 and births to those marriages in 2007. In the 
period from 2007 to 2009 a decline in fertility rate was observed. Vital statistics 
show that TFR increased once more after 2009, from 1,15 to 1,23 in 2010, 1,25 in 
2011 and 1,3 in 2012. In 2013 TFR decreased to 1,19 and after that fertility slowly 
increased to 1,25 in 2015. Despite the periods of increase, the Total fertility rate 
in South Korea is still in no replacement level (The World Bank 2015 KOSIS: 
kosis.kr) (see: Figure 1, Figure 2). 
Figure 1. Fertility in the period from 1960 to 2014 in South Korea 
S ource: The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?end=2014&locations=KR&st
art=1960, 29.06.2016
Many authors (Yoo 2014; Jones et al. 2009; Kohler, Ortega 2002) point out 
that in South Korea the Total fertility rate (TFR) is very low. What is more, they 
emphasize the fact that South Korea is one of the ultra ‑low ‑fertility countries in 
Asia.
South Korea joined the group of nations with lowest fertility in 2001, as 
a result of a rapid fertility decline that began 40 years earlier (Choe, Retherford 
2009: 267; Kye 2012).
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Figure 2. Fertility rate in South Korea in the period from 1992 to 2015
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S ource: Data from Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS), http://kosis.kr/eng/statisticsList 
/statisticsList_01List.jsp?vwcd=MT_ETITLE&parmTabId=M_01_01#SubCont, 10.06.2016
East Asian countries, such as Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore 
have also experienced low fertility since the late 1970s and 1980s, and TFRs 
further declined below 1,3 between 2001 and 2005 (Jones et al. 2009).
According to Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique Chan in 
“Ultra ‑low Fertility in Pacific Asia. Trends, causes and policy issues” (2009) there 
are three groups of countries where the situation caused by the fertility rate differs:
There is now an interesting mix of situations in the world: in some countries, 
lowered fertility is arguably crucial to sustainability and the well ‑being of popula‑
tions; in others, increased fertility is arguably equally critical to future wellbeing; 
in others, a  laissez ‑faire approach to fertility seems justified. In the first two 
groups of countries, the issue of whether, and if so how, governments should be‑
come involved in matters that are frequently argued to be private and confined to 
the bedroom continues to exercise the minds of government planners. The second 
group – countries needing to increase fertility – includes countries such as Japan, 
South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Over the past five years or so, fertility in the 
first four of these countries has fallen to levels below those of almost all countries 
in Europe.
Fertility can decline markedly without a decline in pronatal ideology or in the 
number of children desired or considered ideal. People may still want as many 
children as before, but economic factors, gender ideology, lack of institutional 
support for parenting, and other factors may greatly reduce the influencing force 
of pronatal ideology (Yang, Rosenblatt 2008: 573).
It is very important to point out that the ultra ‑low fertility in East Asia is 
different than its European counterpart in that it does not rule out the potential 
for further declines (Jones et al. 2009). As Chung Eun ‑hee of the Korea Family 
Culture Institute remarks:
This is clearly a  transition period for us, change between traditional values 
and new ideas that industrial development has brought in families. In Western 
countries, it took a much longer time for the transition to take place, but Korea 
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has experienced this great change in such a short period that it has caused much 
confusion (koreatimes.co.kr, 20.06.2016).
Two stages of fertility transition in South Korea
Two stages can be distinguished in the Korean fertility transition: the First 
Fertility Transition lasting from 1960 to 1985 and the Second Fertility Transi‑
tion, from 1985 to the present (Doo ‑Sub Kim 2005: 5). 
A profound shift in values and attitudes regarding marriage, lifestyle choice, 
parenthood, and gender revolution are the driving forces behind the dramatic 
changes in the fertility ‑related behavior of Koreans (Doo ‑Sub Kim 2005: 4).
Doo ‑Sub Kim writes (2005: 20):
The first fertility transition was explained as a function of five factors: socioeco‑
nomic changes, technological diffusion, migration, mortality decline and family 
planning programs. It is widely accepted that the first fertility transition was a joint 
product of socioeconomic changes and family planning programs. Although the 
decline in mortality precedes the decline in fertility, it appears that mortality did 
not play a  major role in triggering the onset on the first fertility transition. It 
was found that Koreans responded to population pressure by migrating, delaying 
marriage, and having abortion, and then, only when these options were exhausted 
did marital fertility sharply decline since the early 1960s. (see: Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Causal Mechanism of the First Fertility Transition in Korea 
S ource: Kim, 2004
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In the Figure 4, Causal Mechanism of the Second Fertility Transition, the 
recent rapid fertility decline in the 1980s is a  joint product of three factors: an 
unfavorable labor market resulting from a  poor economy, change in timing 
and magnitude of family formation and gender equity orientation. If one was 
to highlight a  prominent factor from amongst the exogenous determinants of 
the fertility decline in Korea it would certainly be the socioeconomic changes. 
Without a doubt, socioeconomic change is one of the crucial preconditions and 
underlying forces in fertility decline (Kim 2005: 10–12). 
Figure 4. Causal Mechanism of the Second Fertility Transition in Korea
S ource: Kim, 2004
The mid ‑1980s can be recorded as an important turning point in the his‑
tory of Korean demography. Korea witnessed a continued decline in the level of 
fertility, even though a slight upturn was noticed in the early 1990s. Since then, 
the fertility transition continued to accelerate. Despite the traditional cultural 
factors such as preference for male progeny, rapid industrialization, and urbani‑
zation reinforced the now common desire for establishing small families(Kwon 
and Kim 2002; follow: Kim 2005: 9).
In a very precise way demographic transition in Korea and related factors are 
described by Doo ‑Sub Kim (2004). Table 1 presents a brief review of the history 
of the Korean demographic transition. The stages of transition in Korea and re‑
lated factors such as: period, population growth, fertility, mortality, international 
migration, and political and socioeconomic factors are described. According 
to Table 1, created by Doo ‑Sub Kim (2004), the First Fertility Transition was 
affected by many political and socioeconomic factors, such as: modernization, 
economic development, urbanization, and family planning programs. The Sec‑
ond Fertility Transition which has resulted in an under replacement level was 
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caused mainly by: social development, globalization, growing level of education, 
changes in lifestyle, gender equity, and medical insurance provision. 
Age of women giving birth to first child in South Korea
Marriage composition is also regarded as an important intermediate variable 
of reproduction in South Korea (Kim 2005: 15). 
Cho Sung ‑ho, an associate research fellow at KIHSA (Korea Institute for 
Health and Social Affairs), pointed out that in the Korean society not marrying 
means no childbirth. As Cho claims: In Korea, having a baby out of wedlock is 
socially not acceptable (Ock Hyun ‑ju, koreaherald.com, 27.03.2015). 
Table 2. Age of women giving birth to first child in selected years in the period from 1983 to 1995 
in South Korea
By age of mother By birth order 1995 1992 1989 1986 1983
Total Total 335,416 342,105 301,956 300,431 370,961
First child 167,985 184,400 168,408 162,902 167,284
Less than 15 years 
old
Total 4 8 4 3 0
First child 3 7 3 3 0
15–19 years old Total 3,421 4,428 4,707 8,962 12,874
First child 3,039 3,965 4,085 7,485 10,250
20–24 years old Total 66,312 86,211 88,140 102,398 151,249
First child 49,997 66,780 65,968 73,578 92,523
25–29 years old Total 183,598 180,848 164,797 154,966 162,435
First child 93,743 93,937 84,980 72,545 57,084
30–34 years old Total 67,045 60,320 38,345 28,204 34,083
First child 16,647 16,261 11,292 7,695 5,721
35–39 years old Total 12,950 8,865 4,789 4,405 7,564
First child 3,685 2,808 1,607 1,155 1,206
40–44 years old Total 1,538 940 756 992 2,094
First child 553 351 230 230 312
45–49 years old Total 119 116 109 252 373
First child 35 39 28 46 45
50 years old or more Total 34 74 54 37 116
First child 9 30 20 4 11
Age unknown Total 395 295 255 212 173
First child 274 222 195 161 132
S ource: Vital Statistics, Statistics Korea, data available on www.kosis.kr, accessed 30.06.2016. http://ko‑
sis.kr/eng/statisticsList/statisticsList_01List.jsp?vwcd=MT_ETITLE&parentId=A#SubContwcd=MT_
ETITLE&parentId=A#SubCont
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Multiple studies pointed out that the ultra ‑low fertility in East Asian 
countries is mainly attributable to delayed marriage and childbearing (Frejka, 
Sardon 2010: 315–374). In many East Asian countries women’s average age at 
marriage has increased for the past several decades, which is followed by a rise 
in childbearing age. As of yet universal marriage pattern remains, although it is 
diminishing, and births out of wedlock are also not yet common in this region.
A decline in natality along with the solid link between marriage and child‑
bearing resulted in ultra ‑low fertility in East Asia, which is in stark contrast 
with the European experience characterized by prevalent non ‑marital births. 
The combination of late marriage and the remaining universal ‑marriage pattern 
implies that a  considerable number of births delayed at younger ages may be 
made up for later in these countries once women eventually do get married. 
However, it is obscure whether the ultra ‑low fertility in this region is attributable 
to the postponement of childbearing to a  later age as in European countries or 
just reflects a pure decline in fertility.
Table 3. Age of women giving birth to first child in selected years in the period from 1997 to 2007 
in South Korea
By age of mother By birth order 2007 2001 2000 1998 1997
Total Total 239,190 265,434 301,854 301,987 320,853
First child 128,211 128,128 144,659 150,586 157,256
Less than 15 years 
old
Total 2 3 5 0 2
First child 2 3 5 0 2
15–19 years old Total 1,628 1,852 2,198 2,665 2,807
First child 1,327 1,625 1,957 2,397 2,485
20–24 years old Total 15,519 29,391 35,924 46,113 54,033
First child 12,163 21,492 26,380 34,411 40,255
25–29 years old Total 90,863 131,868 157,714 166,100 176,487
First child 61,871 74,293 87,011 90,561 92,439
30–34 years old Total 99,899 82,340 85,805 69,703 69,896
First child 24,723 25,098 23,911 18,487 17,370
35–39 years old Total 27,608 16,341 16,754 15,245 15,540
First child 8,807 4,528 4,332 3,895 3,918
40–44 years old Total 3,008 2,443 2,348 1,877 1,825
First child 971 859 848 651 621
45–49 years old Total 177 143 144 96 99
First child 75 51 60 41 45
50 years old or more Total 20 8 15 15 10
First child 5 0 4 6 4
Age unknown Total 466 1,045 947 173 154
First child 267 179 151 135 117
S ource: Vital Statistics, Statistics Korea, data available on www.kosis.kr, 30.06.2016. http://kosis.kr/eng/statisticsList 
/statisticsList_01List.jsp?vwcd=MT_ETITLE&parentId=A#SubContwcd=MT_ETITLE&parentId=A#SubCont
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According to the data from Vital Statistics available via Korean Statistical 
Information Service (KOSIS: kosis.kr 2015.08.25), in 1983 the women that gave 
birth to the greatest number of children were between the age of 25 and 29 
(162,435) and between the age of 20 and 24 (151,249) – among them the greatest 
number of women gave birth to their first child at the age of 20–24 (92,523). In 
the years to follow, the number of first births has started to decline. In 1986, 
the number of births in this age group was by 1/3 lower than in 1983 (102,398) 
and it showed a downward trend with each year. With the decline in the lower 
age group, the number of births increased in the higher age group between the 
age of 25 and 29 and between the age of 30 and 34. In 1989, 1992 and 1995 the 
most women gave birth to their first child between the age of 25 and 29 (see: 
Table 2).
In the years that followed, the fertility trends evolved. Older and older moth‑
ers had babies. In 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2001 the women that gave birth to the 
greatest number of children were between the age of 25 and 29. In the lower age 
group, between 20 and 24, the birth rate kept decreasing, with a  simultaneous 
increase in births in the age group between 30 and 34. In 2007, the number 
of births given by women between 25 and 29 (90,863) and between 30 and 34 
(99,899) was comparable (see: Table 3).
The years from 2010 to 2014 saw an increase in the births of children given 
by women between 30 and 34 – it is in this age group that more and more 
women decide to become mothers. Still, in the age groups between 25 and 29 
and between 20 and 24 a continuous decline in the number of newborn babies 
can be observed (see: Table 4.).
In Asian countries, such as South Korea and Hong Kong, women tend to give 
birth to their first child aged 29 and above writes A. Packham (huffingtonpost.
co.uk, 09.03.2016).
The analysis of the fertility trends among women over the years shows that 
contemporary women in South Korea opt for maternity at an increasingly later 
age, which is also the case for European women. In some European countries the 
majority of first births were given by mothers aged in their 30s: Spain (59.4% of 
births of first children were given by women aged 30–39), Italy (54.1%), Ireland 
(52.7%) and Greece (51.9%) (see: Eurostat 2015).
The declining number of births in South Korea since the 1960s has resulted 
in the phenomenon of an ageing society, which means that the increasing 
number of elderly people is becoming higher than the number of young people 
(see: Figure 5).
The changes in the trends of fertility in South Korea, which are equally low, 
as in most Western European countries, do not guarantee the replacement of 
generations. This situation directly translates to problems with the formation of 
the family policy.
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Table 4. Age of women giving birth to first child in period from 2010 to 2014 in South Korea
By age of mother By birth order 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
Total Total 212,079 212,572 235,592 229,144 227,270
First child 109,625 109,467 121,225 116,872 114,022
Less than 15 years 
old
Total 13 13 10 5 15
First child 12 13 6 4 7
15–19 years old Total 1,226 1,320 1,404 1,438 1,335
First child 1,126 1,201 1,250 1,316 1,112
20–24 years old Total 10,392 10,824 11,973 11,919 11,837
First child 7,656 8,115 8,848 8,999 8,710
25–29 years old Total 46,877 50,183 62,184 66,590 71,131
First child 31,997 34,028 42,263 44,812 46,818
30–34 years old Total 107,663 107,275 116,049 107,924 103,678
First child 53,220 52,141 54,969 49,051 45,641
35–39 years old Total 39,932 37,537 38,258 35,919 34,242
First child 13,699 12,296 12,073 11,032 10,229
40–44 years old Total 5,691 5,160 5,455 4,937 4,440
First child 1,843 1,617 1,733 1,507 1,329
45–49 years old Total 158 147 210 239 205
First child 42 48 73 96 87
50 years old or more Total 12 17 21 39 36
First child 6 2 8 8 11
Age unknown Total 145 96 28 134 351
First child 24 6 2 47 78
S ource: Vital Statistics, Statistics Korea, data available on www.kosis.kr, accessed 30.06.2016. http://ko‑
sis.kr/eng/statisticsList/statisticsList_01List.jsp?vwcd=MT_ETITLE&parentId=A#SubContwcd=MT_
ETITLE&parentId=A#SubCont
Figure 5. Population by age groups and sex in 1950 and 2015 in South Korea (absolute numbers)
S ource: World Population Prospects. The 2015 Revision, Volume II: Demographic Profiles, United Nations, New 
York, 2015, p. 617
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South Korea on the cultural map of the world – changing values
The changes in values and norms acknowledged by the Korean society are 
reflected in the results of the World Value Survey, on the basis of which the 
Cultural Map of the World has been created.
The World Value Survey is the largest survey project to analyze values and 
cultural change worldwide. Wave 5 from 2005–2007 covers 53 countries at very 
different levels of welfare.
The analysis of WVS data made by political scientists Ronald Inglehart and 
Christian Welzel suggests that there are two major dimensions of cross cultural 
variation in the world (worldvaluessurvey.org):
•	 Traditional values versus Secular ‑rational values 
•	 Survival values versus Self ‑expression values. 
Map 1. Cultural map of the world created by political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian 
Welzel based on the World Values Survey, wave 5 (2005–2008)
S ource: R. Inglehart, Ch. Welzel (2010), Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between Modernization and De‑
mocracy, Perspectives on Politics, June 2010 (vol 8, No. 2), p. 554
The global cultural map (see: Map 1) shows how scores of societies are lo‑
cated within these two dimensions. Moving upward on this map, a  shift from 
Traditional values to Secular ‑rational is reflected, and moving rightward a shift 
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from Survival values to Self–expression values can be seen. Traditional values 
emphasize the importance of religion, parent ‑child ties, reliance on author‑
ity, and traditional family values. People who embrace these values also reject 
divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. These societies have high levels of 
national pride and a nationalistic outlook. Secular ‑rational values have the op‑
posite preferences to the traditional values. These societies place less emphasis on 
religion, traditional family values and authority. Divorce, abortion, euthanasia, 
and suicide are seen as relatively acceptable. (Suicide is not necessarily more 
common). Survival values place emphasis on economic and physical security. 
It is linked with a  relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and 
tolerance. Self ‑expression values give high priority to environmental protection, 
growing tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality, and ris‑
ing demands for participation in decision ‑making in economic and political life 
(worldvaluessurvey.org).
Each country is positioned according to its people’s values rather than its 
geographical location.
Map 2. Cultural map – World Value Survey, wave 6 (2010–2014)
S ource: World Value Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp, 26.06.2016
According to the cultural map (see: Map 1.) created by political scientists Ro‑
nald Inglehart and Christian Welzel based on the World Values Survey (wave 5) 
South Korea is a country, where in the period from 2005 to 2008 Secular ‑Rational 
Values (about 0,6 above 0) and Survival Values (about 1,3 under 0) prevailed. In 
the period from 2010 to 2014, this situation changed (see: Map 2.). Korean so‑ 
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ciety continued moving towards Secular ‑Rational Values (about 1,0 above 0) and 
moving away from the Traditional Values (0,5 under  0), which indicates mov‑
ing towards Self ‑Expression Values. According to WVS contemporary Korean 
society puts less emphasis on religion, traditional family values, and authority.
In order to show the dynamics of changes in the values accepted by the Ko‑
rean society I present below cohort differences that indicate a long ‑term increase 
of secular ‑rational and self ‑expression values in all cultural zones (see: Map 3.). 
On Map 3., we can see in which direction and at what pace (measured on the 
scale) changes in the accepted values by society based on the Confucian phi‑
losophy have occurred over the past 50 years (South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, China), as well as in other countries around the world.
Map 3. Cohort differences indicate a  long ‑term increase of secular ‑rational and self ‑expression 
values in all cultural zones
S ource: Ch. Welzel, A  Human Development View on Value Change Trends (1981−2006), PDF presentation 
Istanbul, 03 November 2006 – https://web.archive.org/web/20131019111251/; http://www.worldvaluessurvey.
org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_83, 26.06.2016
The analysis of the research results carried out in the framework of the World 
Value Survey shows that South Korean society is moving away from the observ‑
ance of values based on a tradition that is rooted in Confucian philosophy and 
moving towards liberal values. The values and social norms recognized by the 
Koreans are undergoing the process of westernization. Religion, the ties between 
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a parent and a child, and traditional family values continuously lose importance 
for the Koreans.
It is worth highlighting that according to Gallop’s 2012 Global Index of 
Religion and Atheism (see: Humanistic Paganism), South Korea boasts the 
world’s fifth ‑largest population of those who report as “convinced atheists,” 
coming in at 15%. Moreover, nearly half of South Koreans describe themselves 
as “not religious” or “atheist.” The increased number of atheists in South Korea 
also facilitates the changing of norms and values, which in turn affects family 
planning.
An increasing number of atheists in South Korea contributes to changes in 
the recognized values system and has influence on making various life decisions 
relating to family life, education, and work in accordance with one’s convictions.
Conclusion
The greatest influence on such a rapid decrease in fertility was exerted by the 
National Family Planning Program launched in 1962. The nature of the Korean 
family was also affected by the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 (see: Meejung 
Chin et al. 2014). Demographic statistics quickly reveal these changes in families. 
In addition, the decreased fertility was caused by many socioeconomic factors 
such as: industrialization, urbanization, economic development, globalization, 
labor market insecurity, gender equity orientation but also the shift in values 
and norms acknowledged by the Koreans (particularly by the young generation).
In the Korean society, reproduction within a  married couple is still recog‑
nized as the only legitimate form of reproduction. General perceptions about 
cohabitation still remain largely negative. Children of cohabitating couples, that 
is, born out of wedlock, are not recognized as legitimate at all. Koreans still 
firmly believe in the institution of marriage as the only legitimate condition for 
a man and a woman to live together (Eun Ki ‑Soo, 2010.04.06; koreaherald.com).
South Korea, along with other industrialized countries with very low birth 
rates, has come to realize that no single solution is likely to achieve success. A re‑
covery in the Korean birth rate is certainly possible with changes in attitudes to 
women’s roles within the society (and amongst men in particular) along with 
the establishment of programs and policies by the government and businesses. 
Korea has clearly made the commitment to do just that (Haub 2010, prb.org). 
By way of a conclusion it seems important to turn to a rudimentary issue:
So, what is a family? What is it to be with a family? Still, people rely on families. 
They still think a  family is the basic unit of society. There is no society without 
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a family that reproduces its members. Many things will change in the world, but 
the family’s function and importance to reproduce will never change says Chung 
Eun ‑hee of the Korea Family Culture Institute (koreatimes.co.kr, 20.06.2016).
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